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Abstract
In statistical practice, whether a Bayesian or frequentist approach is used in
inference depends not only on the availability of prior information but also on
the attitude taken toward partial prior information, with frequentists tending to
be more cautious than Bayesians. The proposed framework defines that attitude
in terms of a specified amount of caution, thereby enabling data analysis at the
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level of caution desired and on the basis of any prior information. The caution
parameter represents the attitude toward partial prior information in much the
same way as a loss function represents the attitude toward risk. When there
is very little prior information and nonzero caution, the resulting inferences
correspond to those of the candidate confidence intervals and p-values that are
most similar to the credible intervals and hypothesis probabilities of the specified
Bayesian posterior. On the other hand, in the presence of a known physical
distribution of the parameter, inferences are based only on the corresponding
physical posterior. In those extremes of either negligible prior information or
complete prior information, inferences do not depend on the degree of caution.
Partial prior information between those two extremes leads to intermediate
inferences that are more frequentistic to the extent that the caution is high and
more Bayesian to the extent that the caution is low.
Keywords: ambiguity; blended inference; conditional Gamma-minimax; confidence
distribution; confidence posterior; Ellsberg paradox; imprecise probability; maximum
entropy; maxmin expected utility; minimum cross entropy; minimum divergence; min-
imum information for discrimination; minimum relative entropy; observed confidence
level; robust Bayesian analysis
1 Introduction
The controversy between Bayesianism and frequentism may be irresolvable to the
extent that it reflects honest differences in personal attitudes of statisticians rather
than differences in their knowledge or rationality. As Efron (2005) pointed out,
The Bayesian-frequentist debate reflects two different attitudes about the
process of doing science, both quite legitimate. Bayesian statistics is well
suited to individual researchers, or a research group, trying to use all of
the information at its disposal to make the quickest possible progress. In
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pursuing progress, Bayesians tend to be aggressive and optimistic with
their modeling assumptions. Frequentist statisticians are more cautious
and defensive. One definition says that a frequentist is a Bayesian trying
to do well, or at least not too badly, against any possible prior distribution.
The frequentist aims for universally acceptable conclusions, ones that will
stand up to adversarial scrutiny.
On one hand, methodology reflecting extreme caution in the form of the minimax-like
attitude attributed to frequentists and, on the other hand, methodology reflecting the
extreme reliance on modeling assumptions attributed to Bayesians both play useful
roles in statistical inference. Building on that premise, the idea motivating this paper
is that methodology for moderate amounts of caution also has a place in practical
data analysis. The extent of such caution will be formally defined in order to facilitate
making statistical inferences at the level of caution appropriate to the situation.
The formal definition will build on previous work to formalize caution in the
face of uncertainty. Attitudes toward uncertainty have long been mathematically
modeled in the economics literature. Ellsberg (1961) identified two distinct types
of uncertainty: risk is the variability in an unknown quantity that threatens assets,
whereas ambiguity is ignorance about the extent of such variability. The same agent
may be much more cautious toward risk than toward ambiguity or vice versa. A
utility or loss function can model an agent’s attitude toward risk but not its attitude
toward ambiguity. Because frequentist actions can differ from Bayesian actions given
the same loss function, the ambiguity attitude is much more pertinent than the risk
attitude to the concept of caution needed to represent and balance the two basic
approaches to statistical inference.
Ellsberg (1961) distinguished “pessimism” from “conservatism”: the former is an
excessive belief that worst-case scenarios will materialize, whereas the latter only in-
volves cautiously acting as if they will. In other words, the attitude of “hoping for
3
Red drawn Black drawn Yellow drawn
action I $100 $0 $0
action II $0 $100 $0
Table 1: Utility function for actions I-II and the three possible states of nature.
Red drawn Black drawn Yellow drawn
action III $100 $0 $100
action IV $0 $100 $100
Table 2: Utility function for actions III-IV and the three possible states of nature.
the best, preparing for the worst” is consistent with conservatism but not pessimism.
While that attitude does motivate much of frequentist statistics, “conservatism” al-
ready has technical meanings in the statistics literature, e.g., conservative confidence
intervals have higher-than-nominal coverage rates. For that reason, the term “caution”
will be used when assigning an operational definition to the degree of conservatism
toward ambiguity in the sense of Ellsberg (1961).
In an example from Ellsberg (1961), a ball is randomly drawn from an urn of 90
balls, each of one of three possible colors: red, black, and yellow. Nothing is known
about the distributions of the balls in the urn except that exactly 30 are red. Thus,
there is ambiguity in the distribution of black and yellow balls. The agent would gain
a reward of $0 or $100 based on its taking action I or action II according to utility
function displayed as Table 1 in setting 1. In setting 2, the agent would instead gain
$0 or $100 based on its taking action III or action IV according to the utility function
displayed as Table 2. Agents cautious toward ambiguity would choose action I over
action II in setting 1 but would take action IV over action III in setting 2, against
subjective Bayesian concepts of coherence but without requiring the extreme caution
of a minimax strategy (Ellsberg, 1961).
In the absence of ambiguity, the axiomatic system of von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953, §3.6) and later generalizations prescribe choosing the action that maximizes
expected utility. By forcefully applying such a system to conditional expectations
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given observed data, Savage (1954) revitalized Bayesian statistics. The action that
maximizes expected utility with respect to a Bayesian posterior is called the posterior
Bayes action. Ambiguity about the posterior is usually modeled in terms of a set
P˙ of multiple posteriors in place of a single posterior. A multiplicity of posteriors
may arise from insufficient elicitation of subjective prior opinions (e.g., Berger et al.,
2000), from a spread in a gamble’s buying and selling prices (e.g., Walley, 1991),
or, more objectively, from ignorance as to which prior distribution in a set describes
the physical variability of a parameter. The last source accords best with the no-
tion of ambiguity as used in Ellsberg (1961), Jaffray (1989b), Jaffray (1989a), and
Gajdos et al. (2004).
In the Bayesian statistics literature, the most studied decision-theoretic approach
for sets of priors is the (marginal) Γ-minimax strategy (e.g., Berger et al., 2000), which
formulates the problem in terms of minimax risk in the frequentist sense of Wald
(1961). The closely related conditional Γ-minimax strategy (e.g., Betrò and Ruggeri,
1992) takes the action that minimizes the expected loss maximized over all of the
posterior distributions in a set P˙, each member of which corresponds to a prior
distribution in a set traditionally denoted by Γ. That statistical strategy is a special
case of the maxmin expected utility strategy (Hurwicz, 1951b; Gilboa and Schmeidler,
1989), which takes the action that maximizes the expected utility minimized over a set
of distributions. Both “robust Bayesian” strategies are reviewed in Vidakovic (2000).
The following equation extends the conditional Γ-minimax strategy to the problem
of conducting statistical inference at a specified degree of caution κ and with respect
to a Bayesian posterior P˙ ∈ P˙ that is not generally the true physical distribution of
the parameter θ. For any κ ∈ [0, 1], the κ-conditional-Γ (κCG) action is defined as
a˙κ = arg inf
a∈A
(
κ sup
P ′∈P˙
∫
L (θ, a) dP ′ (θ) + (1− κ)
∫
L (θ, a) dP˙ (θ)
)
, (1)
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with the conventions that κ×∞ = 0 if κ = 0 and (1− κ)×∞ = 0 if κ = 1. The κCG
action reduces to the conditional Γ-minimax action under complete caution (κ = 1)
and to the posterior Bayes action in the complete absence of caution (κ = 0). For
discrete θ, this κ is isomorphic to quantities used by Ellsberg (1961), Gajdos et al.
(2004), and Tapking (2004) and is similar in spirit to the quantity in Hurwicz (1951a)
and Jaffray (1989b) that Augustin (2002) calls “caution.” Gajdos et al. (2004) stressed
the equivalent of the rearrangement of equation (1) as
a˙κ = arg inf
a∈A
 sup
P∈{κP ′+(1−κ)P˙ :P ′∈P˙}
∫
L (θ, a) dP (θ)
 . (2)
The κCG strategy has two drawbacks that will prevent its use in many applica-
tions. First, under standard loss functions, the conditional Γ-minimax (1CG) strategy
requires either that P˙ impose strict bounds on the parameter space (Abdollah Bayati and Parsian,
2011) or that A be severely restricted (Betrò and Ruggeri, 1992), and the κCG strat-
egy with 0 < κ < 1 has the same limitation. Second, since the 1CG strategy is not
necessarily a frequentist procedure, the κCG framework does not fulfill the above
goal of formulating procedures that reduce to frequentist procedures given complete
caution.
Following the preliminary notation and definitions of Section 2, an information-
theoretic framework will be introduced in Section 3 to overcome the identified limita-
tions of the κCG framework. Simple examples demonstrating the wide applicability
of the information-theoretic framework will appear in Section 4. Further generality
will be carried out in Section 5 by exchanging roles of frequentist and Bayesian pro-
cedures and by noting the particular applications that call for each role exchange.
Section 6 closes the paper with a brief discussion.
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2 Bayesian and frequentist posterior distributions
2.1 Preliminary concepts
The observed data vector x ∈ X is modeled as a realization of a random variable X of
probability space (X ,X, Pθ∗,λ∗), which for some parameter set Θ∗ × Λ∗ is indexed by
an interest parameter θ∗ ∈ Θ∗ and potentially also by a nuisance parameter λ∗ ∈ Λ∗.
The family {Pθ∗,λ∗ : θ∗ ∈ Θ∗, λ∗ ∈ Λ∗} will be called the sampling model for x.
Inferences will be made about the focus parameter θ = θ (θ∗), a subparameter of
the interest parameter, in a set Θ. In the simplest case, θ = θ∗ and Θ = Θ∗, but
there are many other possibilities. For example, when testing the null hypothesis that
θ∗ = 0 against the alternative hypothesis that θ∗ 6= 0 for Θ∗ = R, it is convenient
to define the focus parameter by θ = 0 if θ∗ = 0 and θ = 1 if θ∗ 6= 0, in which case
Θ = {0, 1}. Let H denote a σ-field that allows any physically meaningful hypothesis
about θ to be expressed as “θ is in Θ†,” where Θ† ∈ H.
2.2 Bayesian posteriors
In the Bayesian setting, the above sampling model is understood as conditional
on the parameter values with respect to some prior distribution, as follows. Ev-
ery member P prior∗ of some set P
prior
∗ is a distribution such that there is a random
triple
〈
X˙, θ˙∗, λ˙∗
〉
∼ P prior∗ and such that Pθ∗,λ∗ = P
prior
∗
(
•|θ˙∗ = θ∗, λ˙∗ = λ∗
)
for all
θ∗ ∈ Θ∗, λ∗ ∈ Λ∗.
Let P denote the set of all probability distributions on (Θ,H). Before observing
data, knowledge about the focus parameter is represented by Pprior, the set of all
distributions of
〈
X˙, θ
(
θ˙∗
)〉
for all P prior∗ ∈ P
prior
∗ :
Pprior =
{
P prior ∈ P :
〈
X˙, θ
(
θ˙∗
)〉
∼ P prior,
〈
X˙, θ˙∗, λ˙∗
〉
∼ P prior∗ ∈ P
prior
∗
}
.
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The marginal distribution of each θ
(
θ˙∗
)
is in P and is called a plausible prior dis-
tribution since it is consistent with pre-data knowledge.
The Bayesian approach yields inferences about the focus parameter on the basis
of a single distribution, P˙ prior ∈ Pprior. If
〈
X˙, θ˙
〉
∼ P˙ prior, then the working prior
distribution is the marginal distribution of θ˙. It follows that the working prior is one
of the plausible priors.
The working Bayesian posterior P˙ and the knowledge base P˙ (Topsøe, 2004) are
defined such that
P˙ = P˙ prior
(
•|X˙ = x
)
;
P˙ =
{
P ′
(
•|X˙ = x
)
: P ′ ∈ Pprior
}
.
P˙ is simply the Bayesian posterior distribution corresponding to the working prior,
and P˙ is likewise the set of Bayesian posteriors in P that correspond to plausible
prior distributions. To prevent confusion with P˙ , members of P˙ will be referred to
as plausible posteriors since they are the parameter distributions consistent with the
mathematical representation either of a physical system or of a belief system (cf.
Topsøe, 1979, 2004). Thus, the posterior that would be used in purely Bayesian
inference is one of the plausible posteriors
(
P˙ ∈ P˙
)
.
2.3 Confidence posteriors
The sampling model of Section 2.1 admits not only system constraints and Bayesian
inference (§2.2) but also frequentist inference in the form of confidence intervals and
p-values. Let H∗ denote B (Θ∗), the Borel set of Θ∗. Given some α ∈ [0, 1], if the
function Θ̂ (1− α, •) : X → H∗ satisfies
Pθ∗,λ∗
(
θ∗ ∈ Θ̂ (1− α;X)
)
= 1− α (3)
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for all θ∗ ∈ Θ∗ and λ∗ ∈ Λ∗, then Θ̂ (1− α;X) is called a 100 (1− α)% confidence
set for θ∗. Suppose Θ̂ : [0, 1] × X → Θ∗ defines nested confidence sets in the sense
that Θ̂ (1− α;X) is a 100 (1− α)% confidence set for θ∗ given any confidence level
1− α ∈ [0, 1] and such that
0 ≤ 1− α1 < 1− α2 ≤ 1 =⇒ Θ̂ (1− α1;X) ⊂ Θ̂ (1− α2;X)
almost surely. A confidence posterior distribution is a distribution P¨∗ on (Θ∗,H∗) for
which
P¨∗
(
Θ†
)
= P¨∗
(
θ¨∗ ∈ Θ
†
)
∈
{
1− α : Θ̂ (1− α; x) = Θ†, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
}
(4)
for all x ∈ X and Θ† ∈ H∗, where θ¨∗ is a random variable of distribution P¨∗.
Polansky (2007) called P¨∗
(
Θ†
)
the observed confidence level of the hypothesis that
θ∗ ∈ Θ
†. Confidence posteriors for which θ∗ is a real scalar (Θ∗ ⊆ R) and the σ-
field is Borel (H∗ = B (Θ∗)) are usually called confidence distributions, each of which
encodes confidence intervals of all confidence levels and hypothesis tests of all sim-
ple null hypotheses (Efron, 1993). Various devices extend confidence posteriors to
cases in which their posterior probabilities only approximately match confidence lev-
els (Schweder and Hjort, 2002; Singh et al., 2005; Polansky, 2007; Bickel, 2011b).
The identity between confidence posterior probabilities and levels of confidence
(4) clears up the misunderstanding that confidence levels and p-values cannot be
interpreted as epistemological probabilities of hypotheses given the observed data.
In fact, since P¨∗ is a Kolmogorov probability measure on parameter space, decisions
made using various loss functions by the confidence posterior action
a¨ = arg inf
a∈A
∫
L (θ∗, a) dP¨∗ (θ∗)
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for each loss function L are coherent with each other in the senses usually associated
with Bayesian inference, whether or not P¨∗ can be derived from some prior via Bayes’s
theorem (Bickel, 2011c,b).
Let P¨∗ denote the set of confidence posteriors on (Θ∗,H∗) that are under consid-
eration. For example, P¨∗ could be the set of a single confidence posterior, the set of
all distributions on (Θ∗,H∗) that satisfy equation (4), or, as in Bickel (2011b), the
set of two approximate confidence posteriors or the convex set of all mixtures of the
two.
The set P¨ will represent the set of distributions of θ
(
θ¨∗
)
for all P¨∗ ∈ P¨∗:
P¨ =
{
P ′′ ∈ P : θ
(
θ¨∗
)
∼ P ′′, θ¨∗ ∼ P¨∗ ∈ P¨∗
}
.
Thus, for any P¨∗ ∈ P¨∗, there is a random parameter θ¨ = θ
(
θ¨∗
)
of distribution
P¨ ∈ P¨ such that P¨
(
θ¨ ∈
{
θ (θ′′∗) : θ
′′
∗ ∈ Θ
†
∗
})
= P¨∗
(
θ¨∗ ∈ Θ
†
)
for all Θ†∗ ∈ H∗. P¨ will
be considered as a set of confidence posterior distributions of the focus parameter
even though more literally they are not necessarily confidence posteriors but rather
fiducial-like distributions derived from the set P¨∗ of confidence posteriors by the laws
of probability. (Hannig (2009) provides a recent review of fiducial inference.) In
the simplest case of θ¨ = θ¨∗, (Θ,H) = (Θ∗,H∗) and P¨ = P¨∗. While confidence
distributions are used here for concreteness, P¨ can be a set of any distributions on
(Θ,H) to use as benchmarks with respect to which the posterior introduced in the
next section is intended as an improvement.
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3 Framework of moderate inference
3.1 Moderate posteriors
Let P and Q denote probability distributions on (Θ,H). The information divergence
of P with respect to Q is defined as
I (P ||Q) =
∫
dP log
(
dP
dQ
)
(5)
if Q is absolutely continuous with respect to P and I (P ||Q) = ∞ if not, where
0 log (0) = 0 and 0 log (0/0) = 0. I (P ||Q) goes by many names in literature, includ-
ing “Kullback-Leibler information” and “cross entropy.” Viewing I (P ||Q) as infor-
mation leads to the concept of how much information for statistical inference would
be gained by replacing a confidence posterior P ′′ ∈ P¨ with another posterior Q ∈ P
if the plausible posterior P ′ ∈ P˙ were the physical distribution of the parameter θ.
Specifically,
I (P ′||P ′′ Q) = I (P ′||P ′′)− I (P ′||Q) ,
as a special case of “information gain” (Pfaffelhuber, 1977), is called the inferential
gain of Q relative to P ′′ given P ′ (Bickel, 2011a). (The notation is borrowed from
Topsøe (2007).)
In analogy with equation (2), the caution κ ∈ [0, 1] is then the extent to which a
“worst-case” plausible posterior P ′ ∈ P˙ is used for inference as opposed to the working
Bayesian posterior P˙ in this definition of the κ-inferential gain of Q relative to P ′′
given P ′ and P˙ :
I
(
P ′, P˙ ||P ′′  Q; κ
)
= I
(
κP ′ + (1− κ) P˙ ||P ′′  Q
)
. (6)
The posterior distribution that has the highest κ-inferential gain in the following sense
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will be used for making inferences and decisions. The moderate posterior distribution
with caution κ relative to P¨ given P˙ and P˙ is denoted by P˜κ and defined by
inf
P ′′∈P¨
inf
P ′∈P˙
I
(
P ′, P˙ ||P ′′  P˜κ; κ
)
= inf
P ′′∈P¨
sup
Q∈P
inf
P ′∈P˙
I
(
P ′, P˙ ||P ′′  Q; κ
)
. (7)
Less technically, P˜κ is the posterior distribution that maximizes the worst-case infer-
ential gain relative to the confidence posterior P ′′, which is in turn chosen to minimize
the maximum worst-case gain. In the case that equation (7) does not have a unique
solution, the moderate posterior is defined to be as close as possible to the working
Bayesian posterior:
P˜κ = arg inf
P ′′′∈P˜κ
I
(
P˙ ||P ′′′
)
, (8)
where the set P˜κ of candidate moderate posteriors is defined as the set of all distri-
butions in P such that every member of P˜κ solves equation (7). By letting
J
(
P˙ ||P ′′  Q; κ
)
= inf
P ′∈P˙
I
(
P ′, P˙ ||P ′′ Q; κ
)
(9)
for any P ′′ ∈ P¨, that set may be written as
P˜κ =
{
P ∈ P : inf
P ′′∈P¨
J
(
P˙ ||P ′′  P ; κ
)
= inf
P ′′∈P¨
sup
Q∈P
J
(
P˙ ||P ′′  Q; κ
)}
. (10)
The moderate posterior action with caution κ is
a˜κ = arg inf
a∈A
∫
L (θ, a) dP˜κ (θ) , (11)
which defines making decisions on the basis of the moderate posterior as taking actions
that minimize its expected loss. For example, if P¨ is the only confidence posterior
under consideration, then P¨ =
{
P¨
}
and
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P˜κ = arg supQ∈P
(
infP∈P˙κ I
(
P ||P¨  Q
))
; (12)
P˙κ =
{
κP ′ + (1− κ) P˙ : P ′ ∈ P˙
}
, (13)
which recalls equation (2). Since P˙ ∈ P˙κ ⊆ P˙, P˙0 =
{
P˙
}
, and P˙1 = P˙, the effect
of κ < 1 as opposed to κ = 1 is to replace the knowledge base P˙ with a subset P˙κ
containing the working Bayesian posterior P˙ (cf. Gajdos et al., 2004).
The two extreme cases of caution reduce decision making to previous frameworks.
A complete lack of caution (κ = 0) leads to the sole use of the working Bayesian
posterior for the minimization of posterior expected loss: P˜0 = P˙ . On the other
hand, complete caution (κ = 1) leads to ignoring the working Bayesian posterior and,
in the case of a single confidence posterior, to the framework of Bickel (2011a), in
which P˜1 is called the blended posterior.
3.2 Minimum information divergence
The following fact is from Topsøe (1979); see also Pfaffelhuber (1977), Harremoës
(2007), Bickel (2011a), and especially Topsøe (2007).
Lemma 1. Given a distribution P¨ on (Θ,H), if P˙ is convex and I
(
P ||P¨
)
<∞ for
all P ∈ P˙, then
sup
Q∈P
inf
P ′∈P˙
I
(
P ′||P¨  Q
)
= inf
Q∈P˙
I
(
Q||P¨
)
.
The resulting theorem is useful for finding P˜κ:
Theorem 1. For any κ ∈ [0, 1], if P˙ is convex and I (P ′||P ′′) < ∞ for all P ′ ∈ P˙
and P ′′ ∈ P¨, then the moderate posterior P˜κ is given by equations (8) and (13) with
P˜κ =
{
P ∈ P : inf
P ′′∈P¨
I (P ||P ′′) = inf
P ′′∈P¨
inf
Q∈P˙κ
I (Q||P ′′)
}
. (14)
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Proof. For any κ ∈ [0, 1] and P ′′ ∈ P¨ , equations (9) and (12), with Lemma 1, imply
sup
Q∈P
J
(
P˙ ||P ′′  Q; κ
)
= sup
Q∈P
inf
P∈P˙κ
I (P ||P ′′ Q) ,
= inf
Q∈P˙κ
I (Q||P ′′)
and thus
inf
P ′′∈P¨
sup
Q∈P
J
(
P˙ ||P ′′  Q; κ
)
= inf
P ′′∈P¨
inf
Q∈P˙κ
I (Q||P ′′) .
Equation (10) thereby reduces to equation (14).
An immediate consequence is
Corollary 1. Given P¨ =
{
P¨
}
, if P˙ is convex and I
(
P ′||P¨
)
< ∞ for all P ′ ∈ P˙,
then the moderate posterior is
P˜κ = arg inf
Q∈P˙κ
I
(
Q||P¨
)
. (15)
Inference is also simplified when at least one of the confidence posteriors is suffi-
ciently close to the working Bayesian posterior:
Corollary 2. If P¨ ∩P˙κ is nonempty, P˙ is convex, and I (P
′||P ′′) <∞ for all P ′ ∈ P˙
and P ′′ ∈ P¨, then the moderate posterior is the confidence posterior that is closest to
the working Bayesian posterior in the sense that
P˜κ = arg inf
P ′′∈P¨∩P˙κ
I
(
P˙ ||P ′′
)
. (16)
Proof. For any P ′′ ∈ P¨∩P˙κ, equation (5) implies both infQ∈P˙κ I (Q||P
′′) = I (P ′′||P ′′) =
0 and I (P ||P ′′) > 0 for all P ∈ P\
(
P¨ ∩ P˙κ
)
(e.g., Cover and Thomas, 2006). Thus,
by Theorem 1,
P˜κ =
{
P ∈ P : I (P ||P ′′) = 0, P ′′ ∈ P¨ ∩ P˙κ
}
= P¨ ∩ P˙κ,
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which was assumed to be nonempty. Equation (16) then follows from equation (8).
Remark 1. Unless κ = 0, the condition that P¨ ∩ P˙κ be nonempty holds whenever the
plausible posteriors are sufficiently unrestricted. The most important such setting for
applications is a complete lack of constraints
(
P˙ = P
)
, in which case
P¨ ∩ P˙κ = P¨ ∩
{
κP + (1− κ) P˙ : P ∈ P
}
and, if P is convex and unbounded, then P¨ ∩ P˙κ = P¨ ∩ P = P¨ for any κ ∈ (0, 1].
4 Examples
The first two examples involve the continuous, scalar parameters typical of point
and interval estimation (Θ = R). For simplicity, each uses only a single confidence
posterior
(
P¨ =
{
P¨
})
.
Example 1. Pθ,1 is the normal distribution of mean θ and variance 1, i.e., X ∼
N (θ, 1), and X = x is observed. Further, θ ∼ N (µ, σ2) with unknown µ and σ of
known lower and upper bounds: µ ∈
[
µ, µ
]
; σ ∈ [σ, σ]. For generality, the bounds are
extended real numbers: µ ∈ {−∞}∪R, σ ∈ [0,∞), µ = R∪{∞}, σ = [0,∞)∪{∞}.
The intervals
[
µ, µ
]
and [σ, σ] are open only as required to ensure that µ, log σ ∈ R
in the presence of infinite bounds or σ = 0, e.g., µ = 0, µ =∞ =⇒
[
µ, µ
]
= [0,∞).
The working prior is N(µ˙, σ˙2) for some given µ˙ ∈
[
µ, µ
]
and σ˙ ∈ [σ, σ]. By Bayes’s
theorem (e.g., Carlin and Louis, 2009),
P˙ = N
(
µ˙+ σ˙2x
1 + σ˙2
,
σ˙2
1 + σ˙2
)
;
P˙ =
{
N
(
µ+ σ2x
1 + σ2
,
σ2
1 + σ2
)
: µ ∈
[
µ, µ
]
, σ ∈ [σ, σ]
}
.
By contrast, P¨ is N (x, 1), not depending on any prior. This P¨ is a genuine confidence
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posterior (§2.3), as can be verified from the fact that P¨
(
θ¨ ≤ θ
)
= Pθ,1 (X ≥ x) for
all θ ∈ R and x ∈ R. The performance of any estimator θ̂ of θ may be quantified
by its squared-error prediction loss: L
(
θ, θ̂
)
=
(
θ̂ − θ
)2
. By equation (1), the κCG
estimate is
a˙κ = arg inf
θ̂∈R
(
κ sup
P ′∈P˙
∫ (
θ̂ − θ
)2
dP ′ (θ) + (1− κ)
∫ (
θ̂ − θ
)2
dP˙ (θ)
)
= arg inf
θ̂∈R
(
κ
[∫ (
θ̂ − θ
)2
dP
µ(θ̂),σ (θ)
]
+ (1− κ)
∫ (
θ̂ − θ
)2
dP˙ (θ)
)
,
where µ
(
θ̂
)
= µ if
∣∣∣θ̂ − µ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣θ̂ − µ∣∣∣ and µ(θ̂) = µ otherwise; Pµ(θ̂),σ = N(µ(θ̂) , σ2).
If σ = 0, P
µ(θ̂),0 is the Dirac measure at µ
(
θ̂
)
, implying that
a˙κ = arg inf
θ̂∈R
(
κ
(
θ̂ − µ
(
θ̂
))2
+ (1− κ)
∫ (
θ̂ − θ
)2
dP˙ (θ)
)
,
which only has a solution if µ > −∞ and µ <∞. Those restrictions are not needed
for the estimate based on the moderate posterior. Since
P˙κ =
{
κN
(
µ+ σ2x
1 + σ2
,
σ2
1 + σ2
)
+ (1− κ) P˙ : µ ∈
[
µ, µ
]
, σ ∈ [σ, σ]
}
, (17)
Corollary 1 entails
P˜κ = arg inf
µ∈[µ,µ],σ∈[σ,σ]
I
(
N
(
µ+ σ2x
1 + σ2
,
σ2
1 + σ2
)
||N(x, 1)
)
= arg inf
µ∈[µ,µ],σ∈[σ,σ]
(
log
1 + σ2
σ2
+
σ2
1 + σ2
+
(
µ− x
1 + σ2
)2)
,
with the second equality from, e.g., Kullback (1968, p. 189). Substituting P˜κ into
equation (11) gives the moderate-posterior-mean as the estimate of θ:
a˜κ = arg inf
θ̂∈R
∫ (
θ̂ − θ
)2
dP˜κ (θ) =
∫
θdP˜κ (θ) ,
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which is unique even if µ = −∞, µ =∞, σ = 0, and σ =∞.
The next example drops the parametric assumptions about the plausible prior
distributions.
Example 2. X ∼ N (θ, 1) with no information about θ except that θ ∈ R = Θ, that
X = x is observed, and that P˙ is the working Bayesian posterior distribution of θ.
It follows that P˙ is the set of all distributions on the Borel space (R,B (R)). Again
under quadratic loss, by equation (1), the κCG estimate is
a˙κ = arg inf
θ̂∈R
(
κ sup
P ′∈P˙
∫ (
θ̂ − θ
)2
dP ′ (θ) + (1− κ)
∫ (
θ̂ − θ
)2
dP˙ (θ)
)
,
which is the posterior mean
∫
θdP˙ (θ) if κ = 0 but which has no unique value for
any other value of κ since supP ′∈P˙
∫ (
θ̂ − θ
)2
dP ′ (θ) = ∞ for any θ̂. By contrast,
equation (11) specifies the unique moderate-posterior estimate given P¨ = N (x, 1):
a˜κ = arg inf
θ̂∈R
∫ (
θ̂ − θ
)2
dP˜κ (θ) =
∫
θdP˜κ (θ) ,
where, provided that κ > 0, P˜κ = P¨ according to Corollary 2 since P¨ ∈ P = P˙κ,
leading to
a˜κ =
∫
θdP¨ (θ) ,
the frequentist posterior mean.
The last example involves a discrete focus parameter, as is typical of hypothesis
testing and model selection applications.
Example 3. Consider the indicator parameter θ defined such that θ = 0 if the
null hypothesis about θ∗∗ is true (θ∗∗ = 0) and θ = 1 if the alternative hypothesis
about θ∗∗ is true (θ∗∗ 6= 0). Equivalently, in terms of θ∗ = |θ∗∗|, θ = 0 if θ∗ = 0
and θ = 1 if θ∗ > 0. If P˙ is a working Bayesian posterior for θ∗∗, then P˙
(
θ˙ = 0
)
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is the corresponding working Bayesian posterior probability that the null hypothesis
is true. Let p(1) and p(2) denote observed p-values of the one-sided test of θ∗ = 0
versus θ∗ > 0 and thus of the two-sided test of θ∗∗ = 0 versus θ∗∗ 6= 0. In this
example, p(1) (x) ≤ p(2) (x), perhaps because p(2) (x) is based on a test that makes
weaker parametric assumptions than that of p(1) (x). For i = 1, 2, let P¨
(i)
∗ denote the
confidence posterior for θ∗ defined given some x ∈ X such that
P¨ (i)∗
(
θ¨∗ ≤ θ∗
)
= Pθ∗,λ∗
(
p(i) (X) ≤ p(i) (x)
)
for all θ∗ ∈ Θ∗ and λ∗ ∈ Λ∗, where the dependence of P¨
(i)
∗ on x is suppressed, in
Section 2.3. Since p(i) (X) ∼ U(0, 1) under the null hypothesis that θ∗ = 0, it follows
that
P¨ (i)∗
(
θ¨∗ ≤ 0
)
= P¨ (i)∗
(
θ¨∗ = 0
)
= P0,λ∗
(
p(i) (X) ≤ p(i) (x)
)
= p(i) (x) , (18)
i.e., the confidence posterior probability of the null hypothesis is equal to the p-
value (Bickel, 2011d,a); cf. van Berkum et al. (1996). With θ¨ = 0 if θ¨∗ = 0 and
θ¨ = 1 if θ¨∗ 6= 0, equation (18) yields P¨
(i)
(
θ¨ = 0
)
= p(i) (x). From widely applicable
conditions for two-sided hypothesis testing (Sellke et al., 2001; Bickel, 2011a) and
with some P˙
prior
∅ ∈ (0, 1) given as the lower bound of the prior probabilities of the
null hypothesis and the restriction that no such probability is 1, the knowledge base
is
P˙ =
{
P ′ ∈ P : P˙
(
θ˙ = 0
)
= P˙ ({0}) ≤ P ′ ({0}) < 1
}
,
the set of plausible posteriors, the distributions on
(
{0, 1} , 2{0,1}
)
with
P˙ ∅ = P˙
(
θ˙ = 0
)
=
(
1 +
(
1− P˙
prior
∅
P˙
prior
∅ ep
(2) (x) log [1/p(2) (x)]
))−1
∧ P˙
prior
∅
as the lower bound of the plausible posterior probability of the null hypothesis, where
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θ˙ ∼ P˙ . That lower bound is the greater of the two lower bounds found by separately
applying the methodology of Sellke et al. (2001) to p(1) (x) and p(2) (x). (The binary
operator ∧ in the above equation means “the minimum of,” and ∨ will similarly stand
for “the maximum of.”) Since Theorem 1 applies, the moderate posterior P˜κ is given
by equation (8) with
P˜κ =
{
P ∈ P : I
(
P ||P¨ (1)
)
∧ I
(
P ||P¨ (2)
)
= I
(
P˜ (1)κ ||P¨
(1)
)
∧ I
(
P˜ (2)κ ||P¨
(2)
)}
=
{
P˜ (i)κ : I
(
P˜ (i)κ ||P¨
(i)
)
= I
(
P˜ (1)κ ||P¨
(1)
)
∧ I
(
P˜ (2)κ ||P¨
(2)
)
, i ∈ {1, 2}
}
,
where P˜
(i)
κ = arg infQ∈P˙κ I
(
Q||P¨ (i)
)
; P˙κ =
{
κP ′ + (1− κ) P˙ : P ′ ∈ P, P˙ ∅ ≤ P
′ (θ = 0) < 1
}
.
More simply,
P˜κ =

P˜
(1)
κ if I
(
P˜
(1)
κ ||P¨ (1)
)
< I
(
P˜
(2)
κ ||P¨ (2)
)
P˜
(2)
κ if I
(
P˜
(1)
κ ||P¨ (1)
)
> I
(
P˜
(2)
κ ||P¨ (2)
)
P˜
(1)
κ if I
(
P˜
(1)
κ ||P¨ (1)
)
= I
(
P˜
(2)
κ ||P¨ (2)
)
and I
(
P˙ ||P˜
(1)
κ
)
≤ I
(
P˙ ||P˜
(2)
κ
)
P˜
(2)
κ if I
(
P˜
(1)
κ ||P¨ (1)
)
= I
(
P˜
(2)
κ ||P¨ (2)
)
and I
(
P˙ ||P˜
(1)
κ
)
≥ I
(
P˙ ||P˜
(2)
κ
)
.
Letting P˙∅ = P˙
(
θ˙ = 0
)
and letting θ˜ denote the focus parameter according to the
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moderate posterior
(
θ˜ ∼ P˜κ
)
,
P˜ (i)κ = arg inf
Q∈P˙κ
∑
j=0,1
Q (θ = j) log
Q (θ = j)
P¨ (i) (θ = j)
P˜ (i)κ
(
θ˜ = 0
)
= arg inf
Q∅∈{κP∅+(1−κ)P˙∅:P∅∈[P˙ ∅,1)}
Q∅ log
Q∅
p(i) (x)
+ (1−Q∅) log
1−Q∅
1− p(i) (x)
= arg inf
Q∅∈[κP˙∅+(1−κ)P˙∅,κ+(1−κ)P˙∅)
Q∅ log
Q∅
p(i) (x)
+ (1−Q∅) log
1−Q∅
1− p(i) (x)
=

κP˙ ∅ + (1− κ) P˙∅ if p
(i) (x) < κP˙ ∅ + (1− κ) P˙∅
p(i) (x) if κP˙ ∅ + (1− κ) P˙∅ ≤ p
(i) (x) ≤ κ+ (1− κ) P˙∅
κ+ (1− κ) P˙∅ if p
(i) (x) > κ + (1− κ) P˙∅.
(19)
Since P˜κ ∈ P˜κ,
P˜κ
(
θ˜ = 0
)
∈

{
κP˙ ∅ + (1− κ) P˙∅
}
if p(1) (x) ≤ p(2) (x) < κP˙ ∅ + (1− κ) P˙∅{
p(2) (x)
}
if p(1) (x) < κP˙ ∅ + (1− κ) P˙∅ ≤ p
(2) (x) ≤ κ+ (1− κ) P˙∅{
p(1) (x) , p(2) (x)
}
if κP˙ ∅ + (1− κ) P˙∅ ≤ p
(1) (x) ≤ p(2) (x) ≤ κ+ (1− κ) P˙∅{
p(1) (x)
}
if κP˙ ∅ + (1− κ) P˙∅ ≤ p
(1) (x) ≤ κ+ (1− κ) P˙∅ < p
(2) (x){
κ+ (1− κ) P˙∅
}
if p(2) (x) ≥ p(1) (x) > κ+ (1− κ) P˙∅,
(20)
from which the extreme condition p(1) (x) < κP˙ ∅ + (1− κ) P˙∅ < κ + (1− κ) P˙∅ <
p(2) (x) is omitted for brevity. In the case of no caution, the working Bayesian posterior
probability is recovered: P˜0
(
θ˜ = 0
)
= P˙
(
θ˙ = 0
)
, which does not depend on p (x).
More interestingly, the case of complete caution leads to
P˜1
(
θ˜ = 0
)
∈

{
P˙
(
θ˙ = 0
)}
if p(1) (x) ≤ p(2) (x) < P˙ ∅{
p(2) (x)
}
if p(1) (x) < P˙ ∅ ≤ p
(2) (x){
p(1) (x) , p(2) (x)
}
if P˙ ∅ ≤ p
(1) (x) ≤ p(2) (x) ,
(21)
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which has no dependence on P˙
(
θ˙ = 0
)
. The simplifying effect of considering only a
single p-value is evident from using p(1) (x) = p(2) (x) in the formulas (20) and (21).
For example, expression (21) results in a unique P˜1
(
θ˜ = 0
)
equal to the blended
posterior probability of Bickel (2011a). When formulas (20) and (21) say no more
than P˜κ
(
θ˜ = 0
)
∈
{
p(1) (x) , p(2) (x)
}
, equation (8) ensures the uniqueness of the
moderate posterior probability by equating it with the p-value closest to the working
Bayesian posterior probability:
P˜κ = arg inf
P ′′′∈{p(1)(x),p(2)(x)}
I
(
P˙ ||P ′′′
)
= P¨ (˜ı);
ı˜ = arg inf
i∈{1,2}
P˙ (θ˙ = 0) log P˙ (θ = 0)
p(i) (x)
+ P˙
(
θ˙ = 1
)
log
P˙
(
θ˙ = 1
)
1− p(i) (x)
 ,
which is a special case of Corollary 2. In this way, the caution parameter, the working
Bayesian posterior, and the constraints on the plausible posteriors together overcome
the dilemma of whether to use the more conservative p-value or the less conservative
p-value.
5 Extending the caution framework
5.1 Variations of the framework
The above framework for balancing Bayesian and frequentist approaches to inference
does not apply to all situations encountered in applications. The various permutations
of the Bayesian and confidence posteriors as the working posterior P˙ , used exclusively
in the absence of caution, and a benchmark posterior P¨ , over which inference will be
improved as much as possible, in equations (12) and (15) lead to four versions of the
proposed approach:
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1. P˙ is a Bayesian posterior in P˙, and P¨ is a confidence posterior. This version
yields the balance between Bayesian and frequentist inference defined in Section
3 and illustrated in Section 4.
2. P˙ is a confidence posterior, and P¨ is a Bayesian posterior in P˙. The potential
uses of this reversal are unclear since it would paradoxically lead to dependence
on a single Bayesian posterior to the extent of the caution.
3. P˙ = P¨ , where P˙ is a Bayesian posterior in P˙. Using the same Bayesian posterior
as both the working posterior and the benchmark posterior is attractive in the
absence of reliable confidence intervals or p-values from which a confidence
posterior could be constructed. Thus, this version extends the scope of the
framework across the domains to which Bayesian methods apply. However, this
version becomes trivial whenever equation (15) holds according to Corollary 1,
for in that case, P˜κ = arg infQ∈P˙κ I
(
Q||P˙
)
= P˙ for all κ ∈ [0, 1] since P˙ ∈ P˙κ
necessarily. In other words, the Bayesian posterior would be used for inference
irrespective of the degree of caution and the knowledge base.
4. P˙ = P¨ , where P¨ is a confidence posterior. Using the same Bayesian posterior
as both the working posterior and the benchmark posterior is useful when a set
P˙ of plausible posteriors can be specified but when no member of that set can
be singled out as special. In many cases involving a continuous parameter θ,
no such member can be derived from the knowledge base P˙ without imposing
arbitrary procedures such as averaging over the members with respect to some
measure chosen for convenience. That will be explained in Section 5.2, where
the case of two unequal confidence posteriors will also be considered.
For simplicity, the versions are described as if P¨ =
{
P¨
}
, but they also pertain to a set
P¨ of multiple benchmark posteriors that define the moderate posterior P˜κ according
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Setting P˙ P¨ or P¨
Bayes and frequentist approaches apply Bayes posterior confidence posterior
no confidence intervals or p-values Bayes posterior
continuous θ & only a set of Bayes posteriors confidence posterior
Table 3: Settings for three versions of the proposed framework.
to equation (8). The three most applicable of those versions are summarized in Table
3.
Generalizing beyond those versions, the working posterior P˙ can be any posterior
distribution that would be used exclusively in the absence of caution, whereas when
there is caution, inferences are made with the goal that they improve upon those that
would be made using any other posterior distribution in P¨. The application at hand
can help determine which of those distributions is a Bayesian posterior and which
is some other type of distribution such as a confidence distribution. For example,
given a working posterior P˙ from a proper prior, a posterior from an improper prior
could be used as the benchmark posterior P¨ in the absence of a suitable confidence
posterior (cf. Bickel, 2011a).
5.2 Inference without a working Bayesian posterior
The more interesting of the two widely applicable variations of the framework is that
in which both P˙ and P¨ are the same confidence posterior. Thus, some implications of
using a single confidence posterior simultaneously as the working posterior and as the
benchmark posterior
(
P˙ = P¨
)
merit noting. First, complete caution (κ = 1) leads
to ignoring the role of the confidence posterior as a working posterior and thereby
collapses to the blended inferences of Bickel (2011a). Second, when κ < 1 and the
confidence posterior is not a plausible posterior
(
P¨ /∈ P˙
)
, the moderate posterior
may not be a plausible posterior
(
P˜κ /∈ P˙
)
. In fact, whenever sufficient conditions
for Corollary 1 are met, P˜κ will be plausible only if P¨ is plausible. That suggests the
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use of κ = 1 in the absence of a working Bayesian posterior in order to avoid excessive
dependence on P¨ at the expense of P˙, the knowledge base. On the other hand,
allowing P˜κ /∈ P˙ makes P˜κ less dependent on the precise borders of P˙, and this may
be desirable to the extent that such borders are uncertain or subjectively specified.
Third, when P¨ ∈ P˙, the moderate posterior is simply equal to the confidence posterior(
P˜κ = P¨
)
under the sufficient conditions for equation (15) given by Corollary 1. The
following examples illustrate the second and third implications.
Example 4. (Variation of Example 2.) This example is trivial since P˙ ∈ P, P˙ = P¨ ,
and Corollary 1 entail P˜κ = P¨ .
More generally, P¨ ∈ P˙ and P˙ = P¨ imply P˜κ = P¨ by Corollary 2.
Example 5. (Variation of Example 3.) Because P¨
(
θ¨ = 0
)
= p (x), the identity
P˙ = P¨ yields P˙∅ = p (x), reducing equation (19) to
P˜κ
(
θ˜ = 0
)
=

κP˙ ∅ + (1− κ) p (x) if p (x) < P˙ ∅
p (x) if p (x) ≥ P˙ ∅.
Re-expressing this as P˜κ
(
θ˜ = 0
)
=
[
κP˙ ∅ + (1− κ) p (x)
]
∨ p (x) facilitates compari-
son with the equation P˜1
(
θ˜ = 0
)
= P˙ ∅∨p (x) used in the blended inference framework
(Bickel, 2011a). Therefore, κ ∈ [0, 1) entails that P˜κ
(
θ˜ = 0
)
is less than the lower
bound P˙ ∅ whenever p (x) < P˙ ∅. That would be clearly unacceptable if P˙
prior
∅ is scien-
tifically established, but if P˙
prior
∅ is instead highly uncertain or subjectively assessed,
then P˜κ
(
θ˜ = 0
)
can bypass P˙ ∅ as warranted.
An alternative to the above approach in the absence of a specified P˙ is to apply the
strategy of Section 3 with P˙ as a function of P˙ , following Gajdos (2008). Examples
of functions that transform a set of distributions to a single distribution include
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the Steiner point (Gajdos, 2008), the arithmetic mean (“center of mass”), and the
maximum entropy distribution (Paris, 1994). In the continuous-parameter case, such
functions require a base measure for partitioning.
There is no need to impose an arbitrary base measure if two different confidence
posteriors P˙ and P¨ are under consideration
(
P˙ 6= P¨
)
. Using them as the working
posterior and the benchmark posterior in equations (12) and (15) would be most
appropriate when P˙ represents a newer or more risky procedure and when P¨ corre-
sponds to a better established or more thoroughly tested procedure. More generally,
equation (8) specifies how to apply a working confidence posterior P˙ with a set P¨ of
benchmark confidence posteriors.
6 Discussion
The featured moderate-posterior methodology has been contrasted with the simpler
κCG methodology. As Examples 1 and 2 illustrated under quadratic loss, the former
can yield unique actions in a wide variety of settings in which the latter cannot.
Using CG minimaxity (κ = 1), uniqueness has been achieved under quadratic loss
by restricting the action space to finite bounds (Betrò and Ruggeri, 1992) and by
similarly restricting the parameter spaceΘ (Abdollah Bayati and Parsian, 2011). The
moderate-posterior estimators did not require such restrictions.
The main advantage of the moderate-posterior framework is that it provides first
principles from which a statistician may derive a Bayesian analysis, a frequentist
analysis, or a combination of the two, depending on the chosen level of caution and
on the quality of prior information. This allows the caution level to be precisely
reported with the resulting statistical inferences. In addition, the caution level may
be determined by the needs of an organization or collaborating scientist rather than
by the personal attitude of the statistician.
25
Various factors may be considered in choosing the level of caution. For example,
more caution with Bayesian inference may be warranted when the confidence pos-
terior represents a frequentist procedure that has stood the test of time than when
it represents a new frequentist procedure based on questionable assumptions. The
caution level could then be interpreted as the pre-data degree of reluctance an agent
has in modifying the frequentist procedures encoded in the confidence posterior.
The moderate-posterior framework of Section 3 is general enough to incorporate
conflicting frequentist approaches, as seen in Example 3. For additional generality,
Section 5.2 provides ways to modify the framework for situations in which any de-
pendence on a subjective or guessed Bayesian posterior would be undesirable.
In other situations, any dependence of inference on the level of caution would be
undesirable. Provided that there is at least a little caution, the use of a sufficiently
broad set of plausible posteriors under the unmodified framework (§3) eliminates any
other dependence on the degree of caution (Remark 1).
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